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The Benefits of Deregulation
by Murray Weidenbaum
The deregulation of American transportation, telecommunications, energy, and financial markets over the past 10 years has been
a triumph of ideas over entrenched political
interests. For 90 years-from the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1886 to the passage of the Toxic
Substances Control Act in 1976-government
regulation of American economic activity
continuously expanded, and created in its
wake powerful constituencies who benefited
from the regulation.
Yet this trend in government rule-making
has changed dramatically and perhaps irrevocably during the past decade, resulting in
remarkable benefits for the American economy. Deregulation has lowered the cost of producing goods and services. It has offered a
wider array of choices to the American consumer. And it has substantially bolstered the
international competitiveness of our economy.
What caused the shift toward deregulation
was not a realignment of political forces. The
most significant developments were supported by a bipartisan coalition in both the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Consumer activists such as
Ralph Nader offered support at vital points,
as did leaders of both political parties,
including Presidents Ford and Carter and
Senator Edward Kennedy. But the most
important role was played by a very unusual
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set of actors in the public policy arena: economists, political scientists, legal scholars,
and similar purveyors of ideas.

Intellectual Support

Three streams of economic research and
policy analysis dealing with different aspects
of regulation reached a confluence in the
early 1970s. The first, and most substantial,
focused on the heavy and widely distributed
burdens that economic regulation imposed
on the economy, especially in the field of
transportation, and the smaller and far more
concentrated distribution of any resulting
benefits. The second research effort dealt
with the fundamental nature of the r~gula
tory process, especially the relationships
between regulators and those regulated. The
third area of research focused on the general
costs of regulation, especially to the consumer.
It is difficult to pinpoint the exact start of
the influential research that led to transportation deregulation, but The Economics of

field also had concluded during the 1970s
that Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
regulation was protecting the carriers (railroads, truckers, and their unions) while
increasing costs to shippers by billions of
dollars a year. Comparable studies were
made of other regulated industries, such as
radio, television, and utilities.
A consensus gradually emerged. Transportation regulation in the United States did not
protect its purported beneficiaries, consumers, but instead was designed to benefit
the employees, executives, and shareholders
of the companies being regulated. Government rule-making shielded entrenched firms
from potential new competitors and kept a
high price umbrella over the regulated industry.

Transportation regulation did not protect
consumers, but instead benefited the
employees, executives, and shareholders
of the companies being regulated.

Competition in the Transportation Industries,
written by John R. Meyer, et al. in 1959, was
a landmark study. Important work followed
on each of the major modes of transportation, notably George W. Douglas and James
C. Miller, III on airlines, and Thomas Gale
Moore on trucking.
The airline industry provided the clearest
examples of the heavy cost of regulation, particularly the price differences for trips on
regulated and non-regulated airlines. Interstate travel was under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB); intrastate travel was beyond the CAB's purview. Research
found that a traveler could fly 500 miles
from San Diego to San Francisco in the
unregulated California market and pay less
than someone flying 300 miles from Portland, Oregon to Seattle, Washington under
the CAB's control.
Most American economists writing in this

The second, and related, stream of
research focused on the political efforts of
interest groups that benefited from regulation. Political scientist Marver Bernstein presented in 1955 a basic "capture" theory of
regulation. As the only political force in the
regulatory agency's environment with any
stability, the industry eventually forced the
agency to accommodate its needs. George
Stigler and Sam Peltzman generalized this
theory, contending that regulatory policy
reflects the interests and the power of the
concerned groups, not necessarily the consumer's. In 1982, Stigler was awarded the
Nobel Prize in Economics for his seminal
articles on the theory of regulation and his
empirical studies of the effect of regulation
on specific industries.
The third line of research-focusing on
costs to consumers-saw the topic move
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from the business pages and academic journals to the front pages and the nightly news.
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) led
the way in the mid-1970s with several widely
cited reports on the high cost of regulation,
among them my own Government-Mandated
Price Increases, Sam Peltzman's Regulation
of Pharmaceutical Innovation, John P.
Gould's Davis Bacon Act, and Rita RicardoCampbell's Food Safety and Regulation. In
1977, AEI began publishing a bimonthly journal, Regulation, that is devoted entirely to
government rule-making. The issue hit a
responsive chord with the media, influential
policy groups, and finally the Congress.

Deregulation gave policy-makers an
opportunity to curb escalating inflation
without trading off jobs.
A few simple concepts made the issue
attractive. Deregulation presented policymakers with an opportunity to curb escalating inflation in a way that did not involve a
tradeoff with jobs. Indeed, reduced regulation would cut both costs and barriers to
production and employment.
The burdens of regulation were characterized as a hidden tax on the consumer ($63 billion in 1976 for a sample of federal regulatory
programs, according to estimates by Robert
De Fina and me). This cost increase was buried in the form of higher prices but it was very
real and often regressive.
Cost-benefit analysis-which had been
used to screen out clearly uneconomical
expenditure projects for decades-also
proved to be useful when applied to regulation. Although the implementation required
dealing with many difficult conceptual and
statistical problems, the general notion of
weighing costs against benefits generated a
positive reaction.
Carefully researched examples of regulatory silliness brought these concepts to the
4

public's attention. Perhaps the first was the
dead haul-the numerous requirements that
resulted in trucks returning empty from
delivery even though there was ample opportunity to fill them wi~h cargo. The public
needed no great expertise in industrial organization to resent the waste that resulted.
This unusual form of applied research concentrated increasingly on the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. OSHA
jokes (based on that research) became a staple of business conversation. Is it true that
OSHA made one company build separate
"his" and "her" toilets even though the only
two employees of the firm were married to
each other? Did OSHA really issue a bulletin
to farmers telling them to be careul around
cows and not to step into manure pits? Both
of those questions could, quite accurately, be
answered in the affirmative.
By the late 1970s, support for regulatory
reform had become widespread. It included
business executives who found themselves
inundated with a flood of rules to follow and
reports to file, lawyers and political scientists
who thought that the regulatory agencies
often were captured by the regulated industries, and economists who believed that regulation reduced competition and increased
costs. Congressional hearings on the subject
yielded support for less regulation from such
disparate groups-and surprising allies-as
the American Conservative Union and the
Consumer Federation of America.

Ten Years of Progress

Progress on deregulation built up slowly
but gathered strong momentum in the mid
and late 70s. In 1968, the Supreme Court
decision permitted non-AT&T equipment to
be hooked into the Bell telephone system. In
the following year, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) allowed a non-Bell
company to connect its long-distance net-
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work with local phone systems. Although
these two actions attracted little attention at
the time, they triggered the forces that led to
the breakup of the Bell system.
In the 1970s, interest rates on deposits of
$100,000 and over were deregulated. Again,
one move toward deregulation ultimately led
to another. As securities firms took advantage of that "loophole," banks responded. A
process was set in motion that has resulted
in the lifting of interest rate ceilings, the payment of interest on consumer demand
deposits, and greater competition among
financial institutions.
Two important regulatory changes took
place in 1975. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) ordered an end to the
practice of fixed brokerage fees for stock
market transactions, and the ICC prohibited
rate bureaus for both trucking firms and
railroads from protesting independent rate
filings by members. Clearly, the regulatory
ice was breaking.
In 1977, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),
led by two economists, chairman Alfred
Kahn and member Elizabeth Bailey, instituted several changes that ultimately led to
deregulation. The CAB gave airlines
increased freedom in pricing and easier
access to routes not previously served. The
results were spectacular. Fares for tourists
fell sharply, planes filled, and airline profits
soared. The CAB experiences provided a
striking example of how regulation had been
hurting the traveling public; in response, a
bipartisan coalition in Congress passed legislation in 1978 that phased out the CAB and
its authority to control entry and prices.
The year 1980 was an eventful one for deregulation. The FCC eliminated most federal regulation of cable television. Economist Darius
Gaskins became chairman of the ICC and economist Marcus Alexis was appointed a member
of the Commission. That, in turn, "encouraged" the trucking industry to support congressional leadership of reform in this field, in
the expectation that the results would be less
6

LANDMARKS IN DEREGULATION

1968

Supreme Court permits non-AT&T equipment
to be hooked up to Bell System.

1969

MCI is allowed to connect its long distance
network with local phone systems.
Interest rates on deposits of $100,000 and over
are deregulated.

1970
1972

FCC sets domestic satellite open skies policy.

1975

SEC ends fixed brokerage fees for stock market transactions.
Rate bureaus for trucking firms and railroads
are prohibited from protesting independent
rate filings.

1977

Air cargo is deregulated; airlines are given
more freedom in pricing and easier access to
new rates.
Congress partially decontrols natural gas.

1978

OSHA revokes 928 "nitpick" rules.
CAB is phased out, ending its control over airline entry and prices.
EPA begins emissions trading policy.
1980

FCC eliminates most federal regulation of
cable TV and of consumer premises equipment.
Motor Carrier Act removes barriers for new
entries and lets operators establish fares and
routes with little ICC interference.
Depository Institutions law phases out interest rate ceilings and permits S&Ls to offer
interest-bearing checking accounts.
Staggers Rail Act enables railroads to adjust
rates without government approval and to
enter into contracts with shippers.

1981

President Reagan decontrols crude oil prices
and petroleum allocations.
FCC eliminates much radio regulation .

1982

New bus regulatory statute allows intercity
bus companies to change routes and fares .
Garn-St. Germain Act allows S&Ls to make
more commercial and consumer loans and
removes interest rate differentials between
banks and S&Ls.

1984

AT&T agrees to divest local operating companies as part of antitrust settlement.
Individual ocean shipping companies allowed
to offer lower rates and better service than
shipping conference.
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drastic than desired by the ICC. Later in the
year, a new trucking law provided much more
pricing freedom to individual truckers, made
entry into the market much easier, and eliminated many costly ICC restrictions-but the
ICC presence was retained. Also passed in
1980, the Staggers Rail Act gave the railroads
new pricing freedom.

Nevertheless, progress continued to be
made. Banking legislation enacted in 1982
allowed savings and loan associations to
make more commercial and consumer loans.

The interest rate differentials between banks
and thrift institutions also were removed.
The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
permitted bus companies to change routes
and fares. In 1984, the Shipping Act enabled
individual ocean shipping companies to offer
lower rates and better service than shipping
"conferences:' Also in that year, AT&T agreed
to divest local operating companies as part
of its historic antitrust settlement in the Justice Department.
In one key area-the regulation of foreign
trade-substantial backsliding has occurred.
Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has
renewed or extended restrictions on the
import of automobiles, meat, motorcycles,
sugar, steel, textiles and many other products. Simultaneously, control over exportsoften justified on foreign policy or national
security grounds-has been tightened. The
Administration does not seem to understand
fully that deregulation is a concept as relevant to foreign trade as it is to the domestic
economy.
In environmental and safety rule-making,
wholesale deregulation has not been the
reformers' goal. The emphasis here has been
on relating the costs of regulation to their
benefits and thus reducing the economic burdens of the regulatory process. Responding
to the critics of its regulatory approach,
OSHA eliminated or modified 928 of its "nitpicking" rules. EPA experimented with "bubble" and "offset" policies designed to give
companies more flexibility in complying
with environmental standards.
In the case of OSHA and EPA policies, the
courts have often been barriers to the adoption of more economically efficient regulations. For example, in 1981 a federal court
ruled out cost-benefit tests performed for a
proposed cotton dust standard because it
held that the law did not provide for basing
OSHA rulings on economic criteria. Nevertheless, the increasing support for reviewing
the costliness and desirability of proposed
new regulations-an approach started by
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In 1981, the executive branch took the lead
on regulatory reform. Building on the
groundwork of the Ford and Carter Administrations, President Reagan issued a new executive order directing the regulatory agencies
under his jurisdiction to perform costbenefit analyses prior to issuing new rules. A
formal review process was placed under the
auspices of the Office of Management and
Budget. Also, a hold was placed on the
numerous "midnight" rules that the Carter
Administration had tried to rush through in
its final weeks. As a result of these efforts,
the rapid rate of regulatory issuances in the
70s substantially decelerated in the 80s.
Progress toward deregulation was made in
other areas as well. The FCC eliminated
much regulation of the radio industry. President Reagan decontrolled crude oil prices
and petroleum allocations, and quietly terminated the Council on Wage and Price Stability.
But the pace of deregulation slowed significantly after 1981. AI though regulatory reform
was one of the four original pillars of
Reaganomics (along with tax reduction,
budget cutting, and anti-inflationary monetary restraint), it never received as high a priority as the other three. A backlash in the
environmental area (fueled in part by the controversial personalities of some of the Administration's appointees) put the entire regulatory reform movement on the defensive.

President Ford, continued under President
Carter, and expanded under President
Reagan-has clearly slowed down the pace of
federal rule-making.

Consumer Protection

The general impact of deregulation on the
American economy has been extremely positive. Diminished government intervention has
expanded the role of competition and market
forces. Virtually every study of the changes
has concluded that the results have been
lower costs, increased demand, and new
opportunities for both producers and consumers of the previously regulated activities.
In the case of airlines, competition has
been especially rigorous; 26 new carriers
entered between 1978-85 and 19 have exited.
This has exerted great downward pressure
on labor and overhead costs. Airline productivity has risen, average air fares have
declined and volume is sharply up. The number of city pairs served by more than one airline increased by 55 percent from 1979 to
1984. While some passengers no longer have
direct flights, the proportion of passengers
changing planes actually decreased from 27
percent in 1978 to 25 percent in 1984.
Moreover, despite several highly-publicized
crashes and near-misses, the overall record
of airline safety has improved since deregulation. The accident rate declined 26 percentfrom the average during 1972-78 of 2.35
accidents per 100,000 flight hours to 1.73 per
100,000 hours during 1979-86.
A few negative results have also occurred.
The recent tendency for airline consolidation
was not expected by many advocates of
deregulation. As of the middle of 1987, a
handful of the major trunklines was coming
to dominate air traffic and passenger complaints about flight delays and lost luggage
were rising. The structure of the industry is
still evolving, and the long-term effects of the
10

merger movement on price and service have
yet to be determined by the newly-unleashed
competitive forces. Moreover, airlines
remain subject to the scrutiny of the federal
government's antitrust authorities.
For the railroads, revenue per ton-mile (a
good measure of unit cost) has been declining in recent years while volume (total tonmiles) and operating income have increased.
In the case of trucking, comprehensive data
are harder to come by. Nevertheless, 65 percent of a large sample of shippers recently
reported lower trucking rates and improved
services. The number of new firms entering
the industry has far exceeded the loss of
older companies. The number of ICCauthorized carriers increased from 18,000 in
1980 to 33,000 in 1984.
Reduced regulation-ranging from outright deregulation to simplification and
streamlining of rule-making-has enabled
the competitive process to work better.
Depositors in financial institutions have
been receiving higher returns on their
money, as a greater variety of companies
compete for their business. Long-distance
telephone users find that greater competition has resulted in lower rates, while subsidies to local service have been eliminated.
Inevitably, the wrenching changes brought
about by deregulation have generated
counter-pressures from interest groups that
have lost government protection. Managers
of many deregulated firms have seen their
pay and perquisites decline to the competitive norm. Some companies have been unable
to survive in the new competitive environment and have gone bankrupt or have been
acquired by stronger firms.
But, clearly, the economy as a whole has
benefited. All economic reform involves transitional costs, which often seem to outweigh
the benefits at first. Deregulation's scorecard, however, has shown nothing but pluses
from the start.
The public interest would be served by
another wave of economic deregulation and
II

by renewed emphasis on reducing the burden of social regulation. In the area of economic
deregulation,
the
Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission should follow the CAB
into the graveyard for regulatory commissions. The consumer would be far better protected by competitive forces in the
marketplace. Also, the remaining vestiges of
energy price regulation should be repealed,
along with the various quotas on imports.
Restrictions on exports should be reduced
only to instances that truly involve the
national security.
Simultaneously, a fundamental revision of
the statutory framework for social regulation should be undertaken. Unreasonable
goals (such as "zero discharge") and unrealistic timetables (such as those governing gasoline usage) should be modified or, better yet,
eliminated. Much more use should be made
of market-based approaches, such as effluent
fees in lieu of detailed "clean" water regulations.
Perhaps the most fundamental need is to
help the public understand the limits of government rule-making. Even if it were staffed
entirely with Newtons and Einsteins, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission could
not effectively regulate the 2 million companies producing the 10,000 products within
its jurisdiction-nor could the Environmental Protection Agency clean any significant
portion of the water, air, and land in and
around the United States. The need is not for
greater compassion, commitment, or technological expertise-those we have in abundance. What is required now is the
willingness and the courage to make difficult
choices among the many alternative
demands for government regulation of private activity.
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